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Introduction
Traditionally, privacy violations have been understood as
invasive actions by particular wrongdoers who cause direct injury to
victims. Victims experience embarrassment, mental distress, or harm
to their reputations. Privacy is not infringed until these mental
injuries materialize. Thus, the law responds when a person's deepest
secrets are exposed, reputation is tarnished, or home is invaded.
Under the traditional view, privacy is an individual right, remedied at
the initiative of the individual.
This way of understanding privacy and the manner in which it
should be protected is being severely challenged by the privacy
problems arising in today's Information Age. These are problems
involving the flow of information: the construction of detailed digital
dossiers about people; the increasing accessibility of personal
information; the growing use of personal information to make
important decisions affecting people's lives; the widespread transfer
of information between a variety of entities; the burgeoning
expansion in different uses for personal data; and the emerging
collaboration between private sector entities gathering personal data
and government law enforcement officials. These problems are of a
different character than traditional privacy problems, and they must
be conceptualized and protected against differently.
Protecting privacy starts with conceptualizing privacy. We need
to understand the nature of privacy problems in order to solve them.
In this Article, I contend that many of these emerging privacy
problems must be understood "architecturally" as part of a larger
social and legal structure. Consequently, protecting privacy must
focus not merely on remedies and penalties but on shaping
architectures. I argue that many of the privacy problems posed by the
Information Age cannot adequately be remedied by individual rights
and remedies alone.
In Part I, I employ the notion of architecture to describe a
different way of understanding certain privacy problems and how the
law should protect against them.
In Part II, I illustrate these points with the example of identity
theft, one of the most rapidly growing types of criminal activity.' A
criminal impersonates an individual by using personal data to obtain
accounts, credit cards, and loans. This upends a person's life, destroys
her credit, and often prevents her from engaging in important
1. See Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Identity Thieves Thrive in Information Age; Rise of
Online Data Brokers Makes Criminal Impersonation Easier, WASH. POST, May 31, 2001,
at Al.
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activities such as making purchases, obtaining loans or mortgages,
renting an apartment, or even getting a job or license.
Identity theft is often conceptualized as the product of disparate
thieves and crafty criminals. The problem, however, has not been
adequately conceptualized, and, as a result, enforcement efforts have
been misdirected. The problem, as I contend, is one created by an
architecture that is deeply flawed. Understanding identity theft in
terms of architecture reveals that it is part of a larger problem that the
law has thus far ignored.
I. Architecture and the Protection of Privacy
A. The Traditional Model
The question of how to protect privacy was of paramount
importance to Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in 1890, when they
wrote their profoundly influential article, The Right to Privacy.2 The
authors raised great concern about new technologies for photography
which would make taking photographs significantly easier and
cheaper.' These technological developments intersected with a
rapidly growing press, which was becoming increasingly
sensationalistic. "Of the desirability-indeed of the necessity-of
some such protection [of privacy], there can, it is believed, be no
doubt."4  The problem facing Warren and Brandeis was that the
common law in 1890 did not provide much protection for privacy.
Around the same time Warren and Brandeis wrote their article,
E.L. Godkin, a famous social commentator of his day,5 also observed
that privacy was being endangered by the excessive exploits of the
press. Godkin was not optimistic about the possibility of a legal
solution to these new threats to privacy:
In truth, there is only one remedy for the violations of the right to
privacy within the reach of the American public, and that is but an
imperfect one. It is to be found in attaching social discredit to
invasions of it on the part of conductors of the press. At present
this check can hardly be said to exist.6
2. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
3. Id. at 195-96.
4. Id. at 196.
5. See Elbridge L. Adams, The Right to Privacy and its Relation to the Law of Libel,
39 AM. L. REV. 37 (1905); Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21
ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1979).
6. E.L. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen: IV. To His Own Reputation, SCRIBNER'S
MAGAZINE, 1890, at 67; see also E.L. Godkin, The Right to Privacy, THE NATION, Dec.
25. 1890. at 496-97.
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Unlike Godkin, Warren and Brandeis believed that law could
solve these privacy problems. Warren and Brandeis argued that
existing legal causes of action did not adequately protect privacy but
that legal concepts in the common law could be modified to protect
privacy effectively. The common law had the necessary foundations
for protecting privacy, for it "secures to each individual the right of
determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and
emotions shall be communicated to others. ' '7 This right "is merely an
instance of the enforcement of a more general right of the individual
to be let alone."8  From this more general right, the authors
concluded, protections against privacy violations could be derived in
the common law.'
What Warren and Brandeis achieved was nothing short of
magnificent. By pulling together various isolated strands of the
common law, the authors demonstrated that the law contained the
seeds of remedies for privacy invasions. They illustrated why creating
these remedies would not constitute a radical addition to the common
law but would merely be an extension and an elaboration of what was
already germinating.
Warren and Brandeis discussed three remedies to protect
privacy. First, they contended that invasions of privacy should give
rise to "[a]n action of tort for damages in all cases." Regarding
damages, "[i]f the invasion of privacy constitutes a legal injuria, the
elements for demanding redress exist, since already the value of
mental suffering, caused by an act wrongful in itself, is recognized as a
basis for compensation."" Therefore, Warren and Brandeis's primary
enforcement mechanism consisted of tort damages to compensate
individuals for the "mental suffering" caused by privacy invasions.
Second, in a "very limited class of cases," an injunction might be
appropriate.13 Third, with legislation, criminal penalties can be
imposed "within narrower limits.""
Warren and Brandeis's understanding of privacy problems has
been highly influential in the development of privacy law, and I will
refer to this understanding as the "traditional model." Under this
model, privacy is understood as a series of discrete wrongs to specific
individuals. These wrongs occur through the actions of particular
7. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 198.
8. Id. at 205.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 206, 213 n.1 ("The application of an existing principle to a new state of facts
is not judicial legislation.").
11. Id. at 219.
12. Id. at 213.
13. Id. at 219.
14. Id.
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wrongdoers. The injury is experienced by the individuals who are
wronged. For example, a privacy violation that would fit well into the
traditional model is a newspaper publishing a photograph of a person
in the nude. There is a particular wrongdoer (the newspaper) that
engages in a particular action (publishing the photograph) which
causes harm to a particular individual. This harm consists of mental
distress and any consequent physical or mental impairment.
Under the traditional model, privacy protections safeguard
against these wrongs to individuals. Protection consists of rights and
remedies for each instance of harm, and in certain cases, criminal
punishments for the wrongdoers. Thus, the traditional model is
reactive. It waits for harms to materialize in concrete form and then
reacts. The traditional model works to prevent future harms through
the deterrent effects of civil liability and criminal penalties.
Another aspect of the traditional model is that it often views
privacy protections in the form of rights possessed and remedied at
the initiative of individuals. The value of protecting privacy is
measured in terms of the value of preventing harm to the individual.
Privacy is treated as an individual entitlement. In the words of one
court, "[p]rivacy is inherently personal. The right to privacy
recognizes the sovereignty of the individuaL"'5 According to the
Restatement of Torts: "The right protected by the action for invasion
of privacy is a personal right, peculiar to the individual whose privacy
is invaded."' 6  Under this view, privacy is enforced by providing
individuals with remedies for privacy invasions. For example, each of
the four privacy torts, inspired by Warren and Brandeis's 1890
article,'7 affords a remedy to specific harms caused to specific
individuals. The tort of intrusion upon seclusion protects against the
intentional intrusion into an individual's "solicitude or seclusion" or
"his private affairs or concerns."' 8 The public disclosure of private
facts tort provides individuals with remedies against publicly
revealing matters concerning their private lives. 9 The tort of false
light protects individuals against the dissemination of false
information."' And the tort of appropriation protects individuals from
the use of their name or likeness for the benefit of another person or
entity.2'
The privacy torts are designed to redress specific harms. In many
cases however, damages are likely to be small, thus creating little
15. Smith v. City of Artesia, 772 P.2d 373,376 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521 comment (a)(1977).
17. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 196.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
19. Id. § 652D.
20. Id. § 652E.
21. Id. § 652C.
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incentive to sue. The result is that privacy is most protected in
situations where damages can be defined palpably, such as where
skeletons in the closet are revealed, where nudity is publicly
disclosed, or where the press sneaks into a person's home to obtain
personal information.
Like tort law, criminal law focuses on specific wrongdoers. It
aims to deter crime by establishing penalties for privacy invasions.
Criminal law is often reactive, responding to crime with punishment
after its occurrence. Frequently, criminal law fails to be proactive in
preventing crime. Although criminal law certainly works to deter
crime, some crimes are difficult to deter. Criminal law can only reach
a certain level of deterrence, which can be limited by difficulties in
catching and prosecuting the perpetrators. Crimes involving the use
and dissemination of personal information present complicated
enforcement problems, since these crimes can occur from anywhere
in the world, are easy to conceal, and take a long time to detect.
Although the traditional model works for a number of privacy
problems, not all privacy problems are the same, and many privacy
problems do not fit well into this model. Elsewhere, I contended that
privacy is not a unitary concept.22 I argued that privacy cannot be
adequately conceptualized by isolating a common denominator in all
of the multifarious things we understand as implicating privacy.
Instead, privacy should be conceptualized from the bottom-up, by
focusing on particular problems which are related but do not
necessarily share one element in common. There are many different
types of privacy problems, and although related, they differ in
significant ways.
The traditional model does not adequately account for many of
the privacy problems arising today. A number of privacy problems
do not consist merely of a series of isolated and discrete invasions or
harms, but are systemic in nature. Although I have argued that
privacy must be understood contextually and that privacy problems
have differences which should be more carefully examined," this does
not mean that privacy is invaded only through a series of singular
incursions. In certain contexts, the privacy harm is caused by a
particular social or legal structure, not by a few isolated actors.
Many modern privacy problems are systemic in nature. They are
the product of information flows, which occur between a variety of
different entities. There is often no single wrongdoer; responsibility is
spread among a multitude of actors, with a vast array of motives and
aims, each doing different things at different times. For example,
when a person unwittingly finds herself embroiled in a public news
22. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087,1092 (2002).
23. Id. at 1126-43.
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story, the invasiveness of the media is often not the product of one
particular reporter. Rather, the collective actions of numerous
reporters camping outside one's home and following one wherever
she goes severely disrupt her life. The difficulty in obtaining a legal
remedy for this disruption is that no one reporter's actions may be all
that invasive or objectionable. The harm is created by the totality of
privacy invasions, but the tort of intrusion upon seclusion only
focuses on each particular actor.24
Today, much modern information gathering occurs in piecemeal
fashion. A difficulty I have described as the "aggregation problem"
complicates the application of tort law in specific cases.25 In isolation,
a particular piece of information may not be very invasive of one's
privacy. But when pieces of information are combined, they may
form a detailed account of an individual, what I have referred to as a
"digital biography."2 6 The whole may be greater than the sum of the
parts. This phenomenon occurs because information that is not
revealing alone can be quite revealing in combination with other
pieces of information.
Further, the trade of personal information between private
sector entities today is not readily analogous to the widespread
disclosure of information by the media. Entities often buy and sell
information, resulting in the disclosure of that information to only a
few other entities. It is difficult to assess damages when one company
maintains a database about a person and sells that information to
other companies or the government. These harms do not translate
well to tort law or criminal law, which focus on isolated actors and
address harms individually rather than collectively.
The traditional view of privacy harms pervades much of the law
of information privacy. Courts often look for specific injuries. For
example, in U.S. West, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,"
the court struck down regulations of the Federal Communications
24. As Bruce Sanford contends: "A stake-out by a group of unrelated reporters
should be viewed as no more than the sum of its separate parts." BRUCE W. SANFORD,
LIBEL AND PRIVACY § 11.2, at 541 (2d ed. 1991) (Supp. 2003).
25. Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy, and the
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1184-95 (2002) [hereinafter Access]; Daniel J.
Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy,
53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1434 (2001) [hereinafter Solove, Privacy].
26. See Access, supra note 25, at 1184-95.
27. Certain more modern privacy laws-namely, a number of the statutes passed since
the 1970s-have minimum damages provisions, eliminating the difficult task of proving
specific harm. See, e.g., The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(4)(a) (1993) (minimum $10,000 per violation); 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c) (West 1993)
(liquidated damages of $2500). Nevertheless, these laws often still suffer from other
problems in the traditional model, discussed below.
28. 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
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Commission ("FCC") requiring that consumers opt-in before
telecommunications carriers could use or disclose their personal
information. The court reasoned that the governmental interest in
protecting privacy was not "substantial" because the government
failed to "show that the dissemination of the information desired to
be kept private would inflict specific and significant harm on
individuals, such as undue embarrassment or ridicule, intimidation or
harassment, or misappropriation of sensitive personal information for
the purposes of assuming another's identity."29 This way of viewing
the harm to privacy fails to acknowledge the larger systemic problems
involved with information flow. These problems affect the type of
world we are creating. As I have discussed at length elsewhere, the
growing use and dissemination of personal information creates a
Kafkaesque world of bureaucracy, where people are increasingly
powerless and vulnerable, where personal information is not only
outside our control but also is subjected to a bureaucratic process that
is itself not adequately controlled." This generalized harm already
exists; we need not wait for specific abuses to occur.
Enforcement at the initiative of the individual also creates
difficulties. Arguing from the traditional model, Fred Cate contends
that although people claim they desire more privacy, their actions
illustrate that they do not want to sacrifice much time or energy in
obtaining it.3' The goal of the law, says Cate, should be to assist those
who want to protect their privacy rather than to thrust a uniform wall
of privacy around everyone: "The law should serve as a gap-filler,
facilitating individual action in those situations in which the lack of
competition has interfered with private privacy protection."32
Furthermore, according to Cate, the purpose of privacy rights is to
"facilitate ... the development of private mechanisms and individual
choice as a means of valuing and protecting privacy.""
However, many privacy problems cannot be adequately
redressed by relying on individual initiative alone. As Paul Schwartz
argues, affording individuals a right to control their personal data
improperly assumes that individuals have the ability to exercise
meaningful control over their information. Schwartz calls this
problem the "autonomy trap." 5 Schwartz notes how consent screens
29. Id. at 1234-35.
30. Solove, Privacy, supra note 25, at 1399.
31. FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 196 (1997).
32. Id. at 131.
33. Id.
34. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609,
1661-64 (1999) [hereinafter Privacy and Democracy]; see also Paul M. Schwartz, Internet
Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815 (2000) [hereinafter Internet].
35. Privacy and Democracy, supra note 34, at 1660.
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on a website asking users to relinquish control over information often
do so on a "take-it-or-leave-it basis" resulting in the "fiction" that
people have "expressed informed consent to [the website's] data
processing practices."" Stated more broadly, there are a number of
forces that prevent individuals from exercising their preferences to
protect their privacy.
For example, a person may want to purchase books from an
online bookseller. Suppose that the person's privacy preferences
consist of the information being kept very secure, not being disclosed
to the government, and not being traded or disclosed to other
companies (even in the event that the company goes bankrupt). But
the online bookseller's privacy policy is standardized and often does
not address these points with any reasonable degree of specificity.
The policy contains a blanket statement that information is kept
secure, but there are not enough details for the person to make an
accurate assessment of the level of security. The policy says nothing
about the bookseller's policies regarding government access to
personal information. If the bookseller were issued a subpoena for
the person's data, would the bookseller oppose it? Would the
bookseller inform the person beforehand? These questions are
unanswered.37 Finally, the policy says that in the event the company
goes bankrupt, information may be among the transferred assets.
And since privacy policies are remarkably similar among many
companies, many other online bookstores offer similar terms. If the
person decides to purchase the book in a bricks-and-mortar
bookstore, she faces the same difficulties if she pays by credit card.38
There, the privacy policies are not even readily available to the
purchaser. In short, there is not a lot of bargaining over privacy. This
state of affairs exists partly because there are not many choices
available to people regarding their privacy and because people are
often not aware of the problems, risks, and dangers about how their
information is handled. Even if they were, it is doubtful whether a
person could create a special deal with a company to provide greater
protections for her privacy. With regard to the level of privacy
protection offered by companies, a person must simply take it or
36. Id. at 1662.
37. See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1099-1100 (2002), for a discussion of the inadequacies of
privacy policies in informing people about government access to their personal
information.
38. This is illustrated by Kenneth Starr's subpoena of Kramerbooks for records about
Monica Lewinsky's book purchases. See Felicity Barringer, Using Books as Evidence
Against Their Readers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, at WK3. In that case, Kramerbooks
decided to challenge the subpoena, but the bookstore was not under any obligation to do
SO.
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leave it. People are not afforded enough choices to exercise their
privacy preferences. Because companies controlling personal
information are secretive about its uses and vague about their privacy
policies, people lack adequate knowledge to make meaningful
choices.
Placing the onus on individuals to protect their privacy, as Cate
recommends, can only be effective if individuals have the power to
exercise their rights. Enforcement mechanisms that rely upon
individual initiative often fail because individuals lack the knowledge,
power, and resources to use them. Toni Morrison's The Bluest Eye
vividly illustrates this point. The novel chronicles the tragic life of
Pecola Breedlove, an African-American girl growing up in a poor and
abusive family. Pecola considers herself ugly and dreams of having
blue eyes. The Breedloves live amid dinginess and squalor in an
abandoned store, which they have partitioned into rooms. The
Breedloves are radically disempowered. All of the rights and legal
protections afforded to people in this country have little effect on
their lives. For example, the Breedloves purchase a new sofa, which
they receive in severely damaged condition. Cholly Breedlove,
Pecola's father, futilely attempts to complain:
[The sofa] had been purchased new, but the fabric had been .split
straight across the back by the time it was delivered. The store
would not take the responsibility....
"Looka here, buddy. It was O.K. when I put it on the truck. The
store can't do anything about it once it's on the truck.... ." Listerine
and Lucky Strike breath.
"But I don't want no tore couch if'n it's bought new." Pleading
eyes and tightened testicles.
"Tough shit, buddy. Your tough shit ......
You could hate a sofa, of course-that is, you could hate a sofa.
But it didn't matter. You still had to get together $4.80 a month. If
you had to pay $4.80 a month for a sofa that started off split, no
good, and humiliating-you couldn't take any joy in owning it.
And the joylessness stank, pervaded everything. The stink of it
kept you from painting the beaverboard walls; from getting a
matching piece of material for the chair; even from sewing up the
split, which became a gash, which became a gaping chasm that
exposed the cheap frame and cheaper upholstery. It withheld the
refreshment in a sleep slept on it ....
The Breedloves accept the torn couch even though it is clear that
the law affords them a remedy. However, the Breedloves are
unaware of the legal remedies they might have and they lack the
ability to bring a lawsuit. This example illustrates that rights,
39. TONI MORRISON, THE BLUEST EYE 36 (1998).
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remedies, and legal protections can only be effective if people have
the power to use them. The Breedloves are powerless because they
have been trained to be powerless; they accept whatever injustice
comes their way because they have come to learn that this is the lot
life continually deals them.
In an interesting contrast, especially to Pecola, stands the
character of Maureen Peal. Maureen is a new African-American girl
in Pecola's school, and she is nicely dressed, rich (relative to the other
girls), popular, and self-confident. Maureen has "enchanted the
entire school" and has a "rich autumn ripeness in her walk."40 In one
scene, Maureen describes an instance where her uncle sued an ice
cream store that refused to serve him:
"My uncle sued Isaley's," Maureen said to the three of us. "He
sued the Isaley's in Akron. They said he was disorderly and that
that was why they wouldn't serve him, but a friend of his, a
policeman, came in and beared the witness, so the suit went
through."
"What's a suit?"
"It's when you can beat them up if you want to and won't anybody
do nothing. Our family does it all the time. We believe in suits."
41
In contrast to the Breedloves, Maureen Peal has considerable
power because she has a very different mindset. The Peal family
members are aware of their legal rights and are able to use the legal
system effectively. They have the financial resources to do so, as well
as the assistance of a policeman whose testimony was essential to the
success of Maureen's uncle's lawsuit.
These scenes from The Bluest Eye illustrate a profound problem
with individual remedies-they are only effective to the extent that
individuals have power to exercise them. Individual remedies are
often powerless in the face of larger forces created by social structure.
A person may have the legal opportunity to bargain to modify a
contract, lease, or employment agreement or to sue for redress if
wronged. But unless that person has the knowledge and ability to
bargain or to sue, the opportunities are often not very empowering.
If we afford privacy rights, we must do so in a system where they
can be meaningfully exercised. Rights to consent to the collection of
data also lack much meaning if people can be readily pressured,
mislead, or coerced into relinquishing their information. Anita
Allen notes that people readily surrender their privacy, and privacy
40. Id. at 62.
41. Id. at 68.
42. See Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy, supra note 34, at 1660-64; Solove, Privacy,
supra note 25, at 1453-54.
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expectations are eroding.43 According to Allen, "[p]rivacy is not an
optional good" because it is a "precondition for a liberal egalitarian
society." A legal system that enforces privacy largely through
individual rights and remedies will encounter significant problems
because of the difficulties for individuals to recognize the harms of
relinquishing control over the information and to have the power and
resources to exercise their rights.
Additionally, the traditional model's focus on privacy invasions
as harms to specific individuals often overlooks the fact that certain
privacy problems are structural and affect not merely particular
individuals but society as a whole. 5 Privacy cannot merely be
enforced at the initiative of particular individuals. Privacy, as Paul
Schwartz contends, should be viewed as a "constitutive value"
because "access to personal information and limits on it help form the
society in which we live and shape our individual identities., 46 Since
certain privacy problems are structural in nature, they affect more
than specific aggrieved individuals. Social structure has effects on an
entire society. As Spiros Simitis aptly observes, "privacy
considerations no longer arise out of particular individual problems;
rather, they express conflicts affecting everyone.,
47
B. Architecture
If we look at privacy more as an aspect of social and legal
structure, then we begin to see that certain types of privacy harms are
systemic and structural in nature, and we need to protect against them
differently.
The concept of "architecture" is useful for understanding how
certain privacy problems should be understood and dealt with. The
term "architecture" typically refers to the design of spaces-of
buildings or cities. I use the term "architecture" in a broader way,
similar to Lawrence Lessig and Joel Reidenberg, who contend that
architecture does not merely describe the design of physical
structures.48 Architecture can be constructed through computer code;
43. Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723 (1999).
44. Id. at 740.
45. Solove, Privacy, supra note 25, at 1454-55.
46. Internet, supra note 34, at 834.
47. Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
707, 709 (1987).
48. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 5-6, 236
(1999); Joel R. Reidenberg, Rules of the Road for Global Electronic Highways: Merging
Trade and Technical Paradigms, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 296 (1993) [hereinafter
Rules]; see also Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information
Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1998) [hereinafter Lex
Informatica].
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it is built into the very structure of the Internet and other forms of
electronic communication, and it shapes the extent of liberty and
control exercised over people in these media.49
Architecture emphasizes that legal and social structures are
products of design. Information collection, dissemination, and
networking are shaped by aspects of social and legal structure. Joel
Reidenberg has long pointed out that information networks have an
architecture, which is influenced not only by law but by technological
considerations.' ° Architecture is an effective way to describe the way
privacy is protected or diminished in our society, for the metaphor of
architecture captures how legal regulations- or the lack thereof-
structure social interaction as well as the degree of social control and
freedom in a society.
Architecture does not merely structure life by direct physical
limitations that channel movement (walls, distance, divisions).
Architecture also alters perception by its aesthetic design, by what it
expresses. Frank Lloyd Wright observed that architecture is "the
scientific art of making structure express ideas." 1  Architecture
creates certain psychological and social effects. As Professor Yi-Fu
Tuan observes, architecture can "sharpen and enlarge
consciousness."52 "Architecture continues to exert a direct impact on
the senses and feeling. The body responds, as it has always done, to
such basic features of design as enclosure and exposure, verticality
and horizontality, mass, volume, interior spaciousness, and light."53
According to Neal Katyal, physical architecture affects human
conduct. 4 Architecture can structure spaces to "facilitate unplanned
social interaction" by positioning door entrances so they face each
other.55 Certain architectural designs can be suffocating and
constraining, such as cramped rooms and dark labyrinthine corridors.
Other architectural designs can promote open space and social
interaction. According to Thomas Markus, "[s]paces can be so linked
that communication is free and frequent, making possible dense
encounters between classes, groups, and individuals." 6
By influencing human behavior, attitudes, thoughts, and
interactions, architecture plays a profound role in the structuring of
49. See LESSIG, supra note 48.
50. Rules, supra note 48 at 296-99.
51. Quoted in John F. Nivala, The Architecture of a Lawyer's Operation: Learning
from Frank Lloyd Wright, 20 J. LEGAL PROF. 99, 111 (1998).
52. YI-FU TUAN, SPACE AND PLACE: THE PERSPECTIVE OF EXPERIENCE 107 (1977).
53. Id. at 116.
54. Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039 (2002).
55. Id. at 1064.
56. THOMAS A. MARKUS, BUILDINGS AND POWER: FREEDOM AND CONTROL IN
THE ORIGIN OF MODERN BUILDING TYPES 25 (1993).
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society. One of the ways in which architecture affects society is by
enhancing or diminishing privacy. Architecture shapes public and
private spaces. Through the use of perspectives and glass, through
the positioning of rooms, doorways, and offices, physical architecture
can determine what is visible or hidden.
Jeremy Bentham's design for a prison, which he called the
Panopticon, demonstrates how architecture can shape the very
constitution of society by affecting privacy. Bentham's design arrays
prison cells around a central observation tower, from which all cells
can be monitored. The prisoners, however, cannot see if there is an
observer in the tower. Therefore, prisoners never know if they are
actually being observed, but they know that at any moment, someone
in the tower might be observing them. This fear of observation
results in increased obedience and discipline in the prison. As Michel
Foucault observes, "without any physical instrument other than
architecture and geometry, [the Panopticon] acts directly on
individuals. ' 57 Unlike dungeons, which served "to enclose, to deprive
of light and to hide," the Panopticon achieves control through
visibility.5 The Panopticon is a form of architecture that inhibits
freedom; it is an architecture of social control and discipline. For
Foucault, the Panopticon is not merely consigned to physical
structures such as prisons. It is an architecture that is increasingly
built into the entire social system: "The panoptic schema, without
disappearing as such or losing any of its properties, was destined to
spread throughout the social body; its vocation was to become a
generalized function."59  As Foucault contends, we are currently
within "the panoptic machine, invested by its effects of power, which
we bring to ourselves since we are part of its mechanism."'" In other
words, Foucault argues that the Panopticon is the architectural design
for modern power relations in society. Panoptic architecture is
increasingly replicated in modern society, in both physical and non-
physical forms.
Panoptic architecture, and the architecture Lessig and
Reidenberg discuss, are "architectures of control,, 6' and they function
to exercise greater dominion over individuals. Lessig observes that
"[c]yberspace does not guarantee its own freedom but instead carries
an extraordinary potential for control., 62 Architecture can function in
a variety of other ways. As I will illustrate later, architecture can
57. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 206
(Alan Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1977).
58. Id. at 200.
59. Id. at 207.
60. Id. at 217.
61. LESSIG, supra note 48, at 30.
62. Id. at 58.
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create a world where people are vulnerable to significant harm and
are helpless to do anything about it. Therefore, in addition to
architectures of control, we are seeing the development of what I call
"architectures of vulnerability."
If we view certain privacy problems as architectural, we begin to
see how the design and structure of information flows affect
movement, communication, association, and other fundamental
practices in a free and democratic society. Privacy is thus an issue
about the type of society we are building. Information flows are
critical in shaping society in the Information Age. Our environment
is not only shaped spatially by the architecture of buildings and the
layout of cities, but by the design of information systems. This
architecture has similar effects as spatial design on our behavior,
attitudes, norms, social interaction, sense of freedom, and security.
The traditional model often views privacy problems as separate
from legal structures, as social problems that are remedied by the law.
We often see privacy as naturally occurring and threatened by rapidly
developing technology. Law must intervene to protect privacy.
However, law creates and constructs the world we live in. This is
particularly true with privacy. To a significant degree, privacy is
legally constructed. Law already shapes our ability to hide
information and it influences information accessibility. Law makes
certain information publicly available; it keeps places (such as the
home) private by enforcing trespass and property 6 laws. Law also
shapes our expectations of privacy in many contexts. 3
The law also influences much of the loss of privacy. Many
privacy problems are the product of legal decisions that have been
made over the past century as we have shaped our modern
information economy. Once we understand the full extent of the
legal construction of privacy, we will realize that privacy is not
passively slipping away but is being actively eliminated by the way we
are constructing the information economy through the law.
For problems that are architectural, the solutions should also be
architectural. Privacy must be protected by a particular architecture,
one that regulates power in our social relationships. An architecture
of privacy protection is a way to structure power in social
relationships between people, institutions, and the government.
Unless people's relationships with bureaucracies are placed on more
equal footing, affording people default property rights in information
or other forms of information control will not adequately protect
63. See Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 843, 846-68 (2002) (discussing how courts, legislatures, and other
government entities shape expectations of privacy); Solove, supra note 22, at 1142-43
(discussing how the law shaped expectations of privacy in postal letters).
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privacy. Protecting privacy thus depends upon regulating
relationships, often by enforcing limits on the power of bureaucratic
organizations.
Architecture protects privacy differently than individual
remedies. It is more proactive than reactive; it involves creating
structures to prevent harms from arising rather than merely providing
remedies when harms occur. The traditional model enforces privacy
through legal remedies employed at the initiative of individuals and
penalties to specific wrongdoers. Architectural remedies are more
systemic in nature, and they work by altering social structure to make
it harder for torts and crimes to occur. As Neal Katyal persuasively
argues, architecture deals with crime differently than criminal
penalties; it can prevent crime, facilitate the capture of criminals, and
can even "shape individuals' attitudes toward lawbreaking."' Tort
and criminal law often focus on individuals in ways that fail to lead to
changes in architecture.
I am not contending that affording individuals a cause of action
or a remedy for privacy invasions is inappropriate or completely
ineffective. Indeed, individual remedies must be a component of any
architecture. However, individual remedies alone are often not
sufficient, for their viability and effectiveness depends upon the
architecture in which they are embedded.
I am also not arguing that the traditional model is incorrect and
should be abandoned. The traditional model was designed for the
privacy problems experienced during the times that Warren and
Brandeis wrote their article. Although it still works for a number of
privacy problems today, it does not work for all privacy problems. In
fact, understanding privacy problems with the notion of architecture
is not in conflict with the view of privacy articulated by Warren and
Brandeis. A critical part of Warren and Brandeis's argument was the
importance of the law's ability to respond to new problems. Today,
we face a host of different privacy problems. We need to recognize
their differences and adapt the law to grapple with them rather than
continue to view them through old lenses and attempt to resolve them
in the same manner as other problems.
Warren and Brandeis wrote long before the rise of massive
record systems and information networks. The problems created by
the growing accumulation, dissemination, and networking of personal
information are better understood architecturally than under the
traditional model. Viewing these problems through architecture
reveals that the problems are caused in a different manner than we
might have originally supposed. It recognizes harm within design and
64. Katyal, supra note 54, at 1073-74.
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structure. And it alters the strategies by which we seek to adapt law
to solve the problems.
Thus far, what I have said has been relatively abstract. In the
remainder of this article, I will provide a specific demonstration of
these points through the example of one of the most rapidly growing
and troubling problems of the information economy-the problem of
identity theft.
II. Reconceptualizing Identity Theft
A. The Identity Theft Problem
A person loses his wallet while on vacation in Florida. His wallet
contains his driver's license and other personal information. An
identity thief uses the victim's information for more than twelve years
to buy and sell property, open bank accounts, establish phone service,
and so on.69 Pursuant to a Florida warrant based on the criminal
conduct of the identity thief, the victim is arrested in California and
imprisoned for over a week. The victim also has civil judgments
issued against him.66
The identity of a retired 74-year old man is stolen. Debts
continue to amass on his credit reports. Although the victim lives in
Maryland, a Texas bank issues a car loan to the identity thief in
Texas.67 The victim continually fights to have the debts removed from
his credit reports, but he is told to take up the issues with the
creditors who claim that the debts are legitimate. Even after debts
are removed, they reappear on his credit reports because a different
collection agency replaces them.8
These are examples of what has come to be called "identity
theft." Identity theft is a problem involving personal information. As
defined by the United States General Accounting Office, "identity
theft or identity fraud generally involves 'stealing' another person's
personal identifying information ... and then using that information
to fraudulently establish credit, run up debt, or take over existing
financial accounts."" Identity theft is not the same as ordinary credit
65. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IDENTITY THEFT: GREATER
AWARENESS AND USE OF EXISTING DATA ARE NEEDED, H.R. REP. NO. GAO-02-766,
at 23 (2002) [hereinafter U.S. GAO].
66. Id.
67. See Albert B. Crenshaw, Victims of Identity Theft Battle Creditors as Well as
Crooks, WASH. POST, July 21, 2002, at H4.
68. Id.
69. U.S. GAO, supra note 65, at 1; see also Jennifer 8. Lee, Fighting Back When
Someone Steals Your Name, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, at C8. For more background, see
generally BETH GIVENS, THE PRIVACY RIGHTS HANDBOOK 227-48 (1997).
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card fraud, where a thief steals and uses a person's credit card. In
identity theft, the culprit obtains personal information and uses it in a
variety of fraudulent ways to impersonate the victim. The thief
obtains personal information from database companies and public
records, or by stealing wallets, pilfering mail, or rooting through trash
to find data on discarded documents.
According to the FBI, identity theft is the most rapidly growing
type of white-collar criminal activity.7' According to estimates by the
Federal Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, there are half a
million victims of identity theft each year." In 2001, the most
common complaint of consumer fraud was identity theft,73
constituting 42% of consumer complaints to the FTC in 2001. 4 Based
on estimates, identity theft results in $5 billion in losses to financial
institutions and other companies.75
Identity theft can be a harrowing experience, and it can be
devastating to victims. According to estimates, a victim must spend
over two years and close to 200 hours to repair the damage that
identity theft causes.76 Further, victims often have to spend thousands
of dollars to remedy the harm.77 Victims experience great anxiety,
leading to psychological harm in certain cases.7 1 Victims have
difficulty "obtaining loans, mortgages, security clearances,
promotions and even gaining employment."79 And as noted above,
70. See Beth Givens, Identity Theft: How It Happens, Its Impact on Victims, and
Legislative Solutions, Testimony for U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee on Technology,
Terrorism, and Government Information 3-4 (July 12, 2000), at http://www.
privacyrights.org/ar/id-theft.htm; see also JOHN R. VACCA, IDENTITY THEFr 8-9 (2003).
71. See Lee, supra note 69, at 8.
72. See O'Harrow, Jr., supra note 1, at Al.
73. Reuters, Identity Theft Tops Consumer Fraud Complaints, (Jan. 23, 2002), at
http://www.techtv.com/news/print/0,231102,3369333,00.html.
74. See Yochi J. Dreazen, U.S. Is Cracking Down on Thefts of Identity, Arresting
About 130, WALL ST. J., May 3,2002, at B4.
75. Id.
76. See Janine Benner, Beth Givens & Ed Mierzwinski, Nowhere to Turn: Victims
Speak Out on Identity Theft, (May 2000), at http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/idtheft
2000.htm [hereinafter Nowhere to Turn]; see also Lee, supra note 69, at 8; Brandon
McKelvey, Financial Institutions' Duty of Confidentiality to Keep Customer's Personal
Information Secure from the Threat of Identity Theft, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1077, 1086-
87 (2001).
77. Christopher P. Couch, Commentary, Forcing the Choice Between Commerce and
Consumers: Application of the FCRA to Identity Theft, 53 ALA. L. REV. 583, 586 (2002).
78. Id.
79. Martha A. Sabol, The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998: Do
Individual Victims Finally Get Their Day in Court?, 11 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 165, 167
(1999); see also Maria Ramirez-Palafox, Identity Theft on the Rise: Will the Real John Doe
Please Step Forward?, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 483, 484 (1998); McKelvey, supra note 76,
at 1087.
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victims are even arrested based on warrants for the crimes of the
identity thieves.'
Identity theft creates these problems because we are becoming a
society increasingly dependent upon personal information. Our
personal information dossiers are critical to our ability to function in
modern life. We increasingly rely on various records and documents
to assess reputation.81 According to Steven Nock, this form of
reputation, based on "credentials," enables reputations to become
"portable."" Portability of reputation is important in modern society
because people are highly mobile and creditors often lack first-hand
experience of the financial condition and trustworthiness of
individuals.83 Today, creditors rely upon credit reporting agencies to
obtain information about a person's credit history. The reports reveal
a person's consistency in paying back debts as well as the person's
loan defaulting risk. Credit reports contain a detailed financial
history, financial account information, outstanding debts, bankruptcy
filings, judgments, liens, and mortgage foreclosures. Today, there are
three major credit reporting agencies-Equifax, Experian, and Trans
Union. Each agency has compiled extensive dossiers about almost
every adult United States citizen." Credit reports have become
essential to securing a loan, obtaining a job, purchasing a home or a
car, applying for a license, or even renting an apartment."
Personal information is also used to establish accounts with
merchants, ISPs, cable companies, phone companies, and so on.
Personal information can be employed to access various accounts and
record systems with financial institutions, health organizations,
schools, government agencies, and other entities.
The identity thief not only pilfers victims' personal information,
but also pollutes their dossiers by adding false information, such as
unpaid debts, traffic violations, parking tickets, and arrests. The harm
of identity theft is not solely financial; it can permeate into a person's
everyday life. The victim cannot readily recover the personal
information the way stolen property can be recovered. The victim
80. Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem, 80
TEX. L. REV. 89, 91 (2001); see also Privacy Rights Clearinghouse and Identity Theft
Resource Center, Criminal Identity Theft 89, 91 (May 2002), at http://www.privacyrights.
org/fs/fsllg-CrimldTheft.htm.
81. ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN'S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY
FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 314 (2000).
82. STEVEN L. NOCK, THE COSTS OF PRIVACY: SURVEILLANCE AND REPUTATION
IN AMERICA 3 (1993).
83. See id. at 3, 73.
84. For example, Experian has information on 205 million Americans. See, e.g.,
EXPERIAN, EXPERIAN FACT SHEET, (2003), at http://www.experian.com/corporate/
factsheet.html.
85. See, e.g., VACCA, supra note 70, at 30.
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must constantly defend against the identity thief's next move. Even
after the victim cleans up her credit reports, if the identity thief
remains at large, there may be further pollution. This is another way
in which identity theft differs from credit card fraud or the theft of an
ATM card or access card. Once the card is cancelled, the crime ends.
With identity theft, the crime can continue, for personal information
works like an "access card" that cannot be readily deactivated.
Additionally, the problem of identity theft is a social problem,
not only a harm to particular people. Identity theft weakens the
security of us all. There have been several reports of terrorists
engaging in identity theft to facilitate their activities." In one case,
identity thieves used victims' identities to create a fake green card,
Canadian passport, and Canadian citizenship card.87 Further, beyond
losses to particular individuals, identity theft results in losses to
creditors, financial institutions, and companies, and these losses are
passed down to consumers in the form of higher interest rates, prices,
and fees.
B. Identity Theft and the Traditional Model
Thus far, identity theft has been viewed under the traditional
model-as a harm to individuals by criminals. Identity theft
unquestionably harms individuals and certainly involves criminals.
Therefore, it is no surprise that identity theft is viewed under the
traditional model and that the solutions to identity theft emerge from
that model.
In 1998, Congress passed the Identity Theft and Identity Theft
and Assumption Deterrence Act. The Act makes it a federal crime to
"knowingly transfer or use, without lawful authority, a means of
identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to aid
or abet, any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal
law, or that constitutes a felony under any applicable State or local
law."'  Prior to the 1998 Act, various aspects of identity theft were
criminalized by a variety of other statutes at the federal level. The
Act provides a more uniform and comprehensive penal regime for
identity theft,89 and it expands the means of identification constituting
identity theft to include SSNs, birth dates, biometric identifiers, and
other information.
86. See Shelley Murphy & Douglas Belkin, Terror Link Seen in Identity Thefts,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31,2002, at Al.
87. Id.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (West 1998).
89. U.S. GAO, supra note 65, at 5.
90. Id.
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Since 1998, the vast majority of states have passed laws to
criminalize identity theft.9 ' Prior to 1998, only three states had
enacted identity theft statutes.9  As of 2002, forty-four states
criminalize identity theft.93 Thus, it is only recently that policymakers
have turned their attention to identity theft, and the overwhelming
approach in dealing with it has been to enact criminal penalties. For
example, Florida punishes identity theft as a felony, with the severity
dependent upon the amount of money the thief takes,94 and the
identity thief may be required to pay restitution to the victim.95
Likewise, New Jersey punishes identity theft based on the pecuniary
amount of the injury. 6 The New Jersey statute does not provide for
victims' rights and remedies. Pennsylvania has a similar scheme.97
Arizona, one of the first states to enact an identity theft law, penalizes
all identity thefts as a low-grade felony,99 but does not address victims'
rights and remedies. Unlike many other states, California, in addition
to criminalizing identity theft with a maximum one year
imprisonment," provides assistance for victims to repair the damage.
The victim can obtain the fraudulent applications made by the
identity thief and a record of the transactions and charges."° Despite
91. Id. at 1.
92. Id. at 7.
93. Id. at 6.
94. Fraudulent use of personal identification information is third degree felony. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 817.568(2)(a) (2000). The offense is a second degree felony if the injury is
$75,000 or more. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.568(2)(b) (2000). The offense is first degree
misdemeanor if the personal information is used to harass the individual. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 817.568(3) (2000). If the offense was facilitated or furthered by using a public
record (see § 119.011) the offense is reclassified to the next higher degree. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 817.568(4) (2000).
95. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.568(6)(a) (2000).
96. If the value received or injury is $75,000 or more the violation is a second degree
crime. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-17(c)(1) (West 2002). If the injury or value received is
$500 or more but less than $75,000 the violation is a third degree crime. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:21-17(c)(1) (West 2002). If the injury is $200 or more but less than $500 then the
violation is fourth degree crime. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-17(c)(1) (West 2002). If the
injury is less than $200, or the person was unsuccessful in obtaining a benefit, then the
violation is a disorderly persons offense. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-17(c)(2) (West 2002).
97. Values involving less than $2000 are first degree misdemeanors. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 4120(c)(1)(i) (West 2002). Values involving 2000 or more are third degree
felonies. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4120(c)(1)(ii) (West 2002). The offense is a third
degree felony if committed in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy regardless of the value
involved. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4120(c)(1)(iii) (West 2002). The offense is a second
degree felony regardless of the value if the offense is the third or subsequent offense. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4120(c)(1)(iv) (West 2002). The grading shall be one grade higher if
the victim is 60 years of age or older. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4120(c)(2) (West 2002).
98. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2008(D)(West 2002).
99. CAL. PENAL CODE § 530.5(a) (West 2002).
100. Id. § 530.8(a).
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some variations, these approaches view identity theft as a species of
crime, akin to other forms of criminal behavior, and the law focuses
on protecting people from the actions of these criminals.
There are several problems with viewing identity theft
exclusively in this manner. First, law enforcement agencies have thus
far not devoted adequate resources toward investigating and
prosecuting identity theft cases. In a GAO survey of ten states,
officials admitted that they had "insufficient" resources to respond to
identity theft.'' Resources are lacking because other crimes, such as
violent crimes and drug offenses, consume significant resources.102
Additionally, "[ildentity theft cases require highly trained
investigators, require longer-than-usual efforts, and often end without
an arrest."'' 3 Prison sentences for identity theft are relatively short.1°'
Identity theft often occurs across different jurisdictions, and law
enforcement officials "sometimes tend to view identity theft as being
'someone else's problem."" 5 As a result, most identity theft crimes
remain unsolved.'0
Second, the retrospective view of the law, which allows
individuals to fix the damage caused by identity theft, is complicated
by the profound lack of power individuals have over controlling their
personal information. Victims experience great difficulty in obtaining
redress for identity theft.
Victims are often unaware that their identities have been stolen
until long after the identity theft has begun. A report based on victim
surveys estimates that it takes victims over a year to discover that
they have been victimized."' According to FTC estimates, 20% of
identity theft victims learn of the theft after two years.' One tip-off
that a person is a victim of identity theft is an unusual item on one's
credit report. The identity thief often takes out loans and uses lines
of credit which the thief never pays back. These delinquencies show
up on the victim's credit report, and destroy the victim's credit rating.
Unfortunately, the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), °9 which
regulates credit reporting agencies, fails to provide people with
adequate resources to discover that they are being victimized or
repair the damage done by identity theft. Although the FCRA
101. U.S. GAO, supra note 65, at 17.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 18.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Lee, supra note 69, at C8.
107. Nowhere to Turn, supra note 76, at 3.
108. Jane Black, Who's Policing the Credit Cops?, Bus. WEEK ONLINE (Aug. 29, 2002),
at http://www.businessweek.com/print/technology/content/aug2002/tc20020829-8532.htm.
109. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (West 1998).
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permits individuals to contest the accuracy of information in their
credit histories' 0 and enables individuals to sue to collect damages for
violations of the Act,' these rights often are ineffectual. One
problem is that people often do not know what information is
contained in their credit reports. To obtain such information, people
must pay a fee of $8.50 to each of the three major credit reporting
agencies-Experian, Equifax, and Trans Union-to obtain a copy of
their credit report. And individuals must do this with regularity to
ensure that their credit reports remain accurate.
Credit reporting agencies have a duty to investigate consumer
disputes with the accuracy of their reports, but this often is ineffective
in cases of identity theft.1 2 In one of the most important scholarly
articles written about identity theft, Lynn LoPucki observes that the
"victim is asked to prove a negative: namely, that he or she is not the
person who borrowed from the creditor. The victim's evidence is
lil:ely to be complex and circumstantial.""' 3 Creditors do not have
sufficient incentives to investigate, for if the victim is correct,
creditors cannot recover on the debt."' LoPucki also aptly argues
that the "victim lacks a forum in which to proceed. The victim has no
right to a hearing on the accuracy of the information requested."'' 5
Moreover, the "FTC seldom acts on the complaint of a single
customer."".6
The FCRA does not allow people to sue for "defamation,
invasion of privacy, or negligence" when the credit reporting agency
discloses false information or a creditor reports false information to a
credit reporting agency unless the information is "furnished with
malice or willful intent to injure such consumer."".7  Rather, the
FCRA provides a cause of action for negligently failing to comply
with its provisions."8 However, a victim must bring an action within
two years "from the date on which the liability arises.""' In TRW,
Inc. v. Andrews, 2 ° the Supreme Court held that two-year statute of
limitations period does not begin to run when the plaintiff discovers
that the FCRA has been violated. Rather, the statute of limitations
110. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (West 1998).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (West 1998).
112. LoPucki, supra note 80, at 92.
113. Id. at 107.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (West 1998).
118. lid. § 1681o.
119. Id. § 1681p.
120. 534 U.S. 19, 26 (2001).
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begins when the violations occurred, even if the plaintiff remains
unaware of the violations.
At present, the law does not allow individuals enough
involvement in the uses and dissemination of their personal
information to quickly discover that they are victims of identity theft
or to obtain redress after identity theft occurs.
Viewing identity theft under the traditional model-as a series of
isolated thefts from particular individuals-results in commentators
often urging individuals to take a variety of steps to avoid being
victimized. Thus, many discussions about solving identity theft
include recommendations for how individuals can protect themselves
against identity theft. As one commentator concludes: "[W]ith hard
work, cooperation, and effective communication between law
enforcement and the public, identity thieves will be held
accountable."' 2 ' Professor Fred Cate takes an even stronger position,
contending that the problem of identity theft can be prevented
significantly if people exercised more care over their data:
Despite all the bills introduced to combat the theft of identity,
individual action may provide the best defense: keeping a close
watch on account activity; reporting suspicious or unfamiliar
transactions promptly; properly destroying commercial
solicitations; storing valuable documents securely; protecting
account names and passwords; and never disclosing personal
information to unknown callers.'
A report by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
reprinted by the FTC suggests several tips for people to "minimize"
the risk of identity theft:'2
Pay attention to your billing cycles ....
Guard your mail from theft ....
Do not give out personal information ....
Keep items with personal information in a safe place ....
Give your SSN only when absolutely necessary....
Don't carry your SSN card; leave it in a secure place ....
Order a copy of your credit report from each of the three major
credit reporting agencies every year .... 124
The general advice is that if people take a number of steps,
identity theft will be minimized. However, personal data is often
121. Sean B. Hoar, Identity Theft: The Crime of the New Millennium, 80 OR. L. REV.
1423,1447 (2001).
122. FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN PERSPECTIVE 22 (2001).
123. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION & ID THEFr: WHEN BAD THINGS HAPPEN TO
YOUR GOOD NAME 3 (2002) [hereinafter FTC, BAD THINGS].
124. Id. at 5-7.
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collected unwittingly, without consent; SSNs are frequently used and
refusal to give out one's SSN results in considerable inconvenience;
and many people cannot even name the three major credit reporting
agencies, let alone request a copy of their credit reports, for which
they are charged a fee. Even if people did take all these steps, the
risks of identity theft are still not significantly minimized. According
to an official at the FTC, "[t]here is no way you can fully immunize
yourself from identity theft because the information is out there." '25
I contend that the prevailing approach toward dealing with
identity theft-by relying on increasing criminal penalties and by
depending upon individuals to take great lengths to try to protect
themselves against their vulnerabilities to identity theft-has the
wrong focus. Of course, identity thieves should be prosecuted; and
people should avoid being careless with their data. The law has
significant room to improve in the prosecution of identity theft. But
these solutions fail to address the foundations of the problem. The
underlying cause of identity theft is an architecture that makes us
vulnerable to such crimes and unable to adequately repair the
damage.
C. Identity Theft as Architecture
Identity theft is a consequence of an architecture, one that
creates a series of vulnerabilities. This architecture is not created by
identity thieves; rather, it is exploited by them. It is an architecture of
vulnerability, one where personal information is not protected with
adequate security, where identity thieves have easy access to data and
the ability to use it in detrimental ways. We are increasingly living
with what I call "digital dossiers" about our lives, and these dossiers
are not controlled by us but by various entities, such as private-sector
companies and the government. These dossiers play a profound role
in our lives in modern society. The identity thief taps into these
dossiers and uses them, manipulates them, and pollutes them. The
identity thief's ability to so easily access and use our personal data
stems from an architecture that does not provide adequate security to
our personal information and that does not afford us with a sufficient
degree of participation in the collection, dissemination, and use of
that information. Consequently, it is difficult for the victim to figure
out what is going on and how she can remedy the situation.
The traditional view fails to address this architecture, for it
focuses on identity theft as a series of discrete instances of crime
rather than as a larger problem about the way our personal
information is handled. Even the term of "identity theft" views it as
125. Lee, supra note 69, at C8.
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an instance of crime-a "theft" rather than as the product of
inadequate security.
The architecture enabling identity theft emerges from the
government and the private sector. With regard to the government
part of the structure, the Social Security number ("SSN") and public
record systems create a regime where identity is readily stolen and
the consequences are severe.
SSNs are a key piece of information for identity theft. SSNs can
unlock a wealth of other information held by the government and the
private sector.'26 The identity thief, as Lynn LoPucki observes,
"ordinarily needs personal information about the victim, such as the
victim's name, social security number, birth date, or mother's maiden
name."'27 Thus, information enables the identity thief to apply for
credit or open accounts in the victim's name.1
28
One of the primary means by which a national identification
system is developing in the United States is the SSN. The SSN is
currently used for identification in a number of contexts. SSNs were
created in 1936 as part of the Social Security System and were not
designed to be used for a general identifier. Indeed, for many years,
the social security card stated that it was "NOT FOR
IDENTIFICATION.' 29  However, over time, numerous federal
agencies began using the SSN for identification, as well as state and
local governments, schools, banks, hospitals, and other private sector
entities.
3 10
In the early 1970s, the growing uses of the SSN raised serious
concerns that the SSN would become a de facto universal identifier.
In 1973, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare issued a
major report on privacy, stating:
We take the position that a standard universal identifier (SUI)
should not be established in the United States now or in the
foreseeable future. By our definition, the Social Security Number
(SSN) cannot fully qualify as an SUI; it only approximates one.
However, there is an increasing tendency for the Social Security
number to be used as if it were an SUI.'
3
'
126. U.S. GAO, supra note 65, at 7.
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In the Privacy Act of 1974, Congress partially responded to these
concerns by prohibiting government agencies from denying any right,
benefit, or privilege merely because an individual refused to disclose
his or her SSN. The Privacy Act was passed to "curtail the expanding
use of social security numbers by federal and local agencies and, by so
doing, to eliminate the threat to individual privacy and confidentiality
of information posed by common numerical identifiers.',3 2 However,
the Privacy Act did not restrict the use of SSNs by the private sector.
The use of the SSN continued to escalate after the Privacy Act.133
SSNs are collected by private-sector database firms from a number of
public and non-public sources, such as court records or credit reports.
It is currently legal for private firms to sell or disclose SSNs. As one
commentator has observed, "governmental dissemination of personal
identifying numbers is still widespread, and limits on private actors
are also virtually nonexistent."'34
The SSN functions in the United States as a de facto identifier,
and there is scant protection on its use. SSNs are often widely
available. Schools frequently use student SSNs as student identifiers.
This exposes student SSNs to a large number of university personnel.
States often place SSNs on driver's licenses. This exposes SSNs to
anybody who checks a driver's license for identification.
Additionally, SSNs are requested on a wide variety of applications.
SSNs are used as passwords to obtain access to a host of personal
records from banks, investment companies, schools, hospitals,
doctors, and so on.35 The SSN is a powerful number, for with it a
person can open and close accounts, change addresses, obtain loans,
access personal information, make financial transactions, and more.
Indeed, several courts have noted the myriad ways SSNs can be
misused to gain access to an individual's personal information or
accounts. In Greidinger v. Davis, 13 6 the court struck down a voter
registration system requiring voters to provide SSNs (which were
then made publicly available). This system infringed upon the right
to vote because it forced people to risk public disclosure of their SSNs
RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS xxxii (1973) [hereinafter HEW
1973 REPORT].
132. Doyle v. Wilson, 529 F. Supp. 1343, 1348 (D. Del. 1982).
133. See U.S. GAO, supra note 65.
134. Flavio L. Komuves, We've Got Your Number: An Overview of Legislation and
Decisions to Control the Use of Social Security Numbers as Personal Identifiers, 16 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 529,569 (1998).
135. For example, an identity thief purchased the SSNs of several top corporate
executives from Internet database companies. The thief then used the SSNs to obtain
more personal information about the victims. Benjamin Weiser, Identity Theft, and These
Were Big Identities, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2002, at B3.
136. 988 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir. 1993).
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in order to vote, exposing them to undue risks.37 In Beacon Journal
v. City of Akron,3 ' a court held that a state freedom of information
act did not extend to public employees' SSNs:
Thanks to the abundance of databases in the private sector that
include the SSNs of persons listed in their files, an intruder using an
SSN can quietly discover the intimate details of a victim's personal
life without the victim ever knowing of the intrusion.
According to the Court, the disclosure of SSNs would create a
"high potential for fraud and victimization.""' Likewise, in City of
Kirkland v. Sheehan,'4 ' a court restricted the disclosure of law
enforcement personnel's SSNs because:
Access to an individual's SSN enables a new holder to obtain access
to and to control, manipulate or alter other personal information.
In effect, access to an SSN allows a person, agency or company to
more efficiently and effectively search for and seize information
and assets of another.42
In short, the SSN functions as a magic key that can unlock vast
stores of records as well as financial accounts. The SSN is the identity
thief's best tool.
Viewed in terms of architecture, the government has created an
identification number without affording adequate precautions against
its misuse. In so doing, the government has exposed every citizen to
significant vulnerability to identity theft and other crimes such as
fraud and stalking. Seen in this light, the problem is very much the
product of the law. Identity thieves are certainly to blame, but we
must also recognize the profound role that the government has played
in creating the problem.
Not only are the uses of SSNs inadequately controlled, but SSNs
are relatively easy for the identity thief to obtain. SSNs and other
personal information that assists identity thieves can be obtained via
public records or from database companies that market personal data
culled from public records. Identity thieves can obtain the data to
carry out their crime from various personal information record
systems.'43 Public record systems can reveal a panoply of personal
information, which can be aggregated and combined with other data
to construct what amounts to a "digital biography" about a person.
There are over 165 companies that gather information from public
137. Id. at 1354.
138. 640 N.E.2d 164 (Ohio, 1994).
139. Id. at 169.
140. Id.
141. No. 01-2-09513-7 SEA, 2001 WL 1751590 (Wash. Super. May 10, 2001).
142. Id. at 2372.
143. See O'Harrow, Jr., supra note 1 at Al.
144. See Access, supra note 25, at 1184-95.
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records across the country and peddle that data over the Internet.'
Public records can contain SSNs, birth dates, mother's maiden names,
addresses of home and work, property descriptions and value, phone
numbers, photographs, height, weight, eye color, gender, email
addresses, and salary information.'46 Court records can contain even
more sensitive information about medical conditions, employment,
and finances.'47 SSNs are in fact required by law to be publicly
disclosed in bankruptcy records.'
Identity thieves thus can plunder public records, which are
increasingly being made readily accessible on the Internet, for
personal information to carry out their crimes. For example, recently
the clerk of courts for Hamilton County, Ohio placed the county's
public records on the Internet. From a speeding ticket placed on the
website, an identity thief accessed a victim's SSN, address, birth date,
signature, and other personal information and opened up credit card
accounts in the victim's name.9 Further, identity thieves can obtain
SSNs and other personal information simply by paying a small fee to
various database companies and obtaining a detailed dossier about
their victims.5"" Some identity thieves employ information brokers
and private investigators to obtain personal information, and the
practices of certain information brokers and private investigators are
often unsavory. One practice is hiring pretext callers, who call
financial companies and impersonate a customer in order to obtain
personal information.'5'
The problem, however, runs deeper than the public disclosure of
SSNs and personal information. The problem stems not only from
the government's creation of a de facto identifier and lax protection
of it, but also from the private sector's inadequate security measures
in handling personal information. Private sector entities lack
adequate ways of controlling access to records and accounts in a
person's name, and numerous companies engage in the common
practice of using SSNs, mother's maiden names, and addresses for
145. Id. at 1152-53.
146. Id. at 1142-49.
147. Id. at 1145-48.
148. See 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (Any "paper filed.., and the dockets of a bankruptcy court
are public records and open to examination by an entity at reasonable times without
charge."); see also Mary Jo Obee & William C. Plouffe, Jr., Privacy in the Federal
Bankruptcy Courts, 14 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 1011, 1020 (2000).
149. Jennifer 8. Lee, Dirty Laundry Online For All to See: By Posting Court Records,
Cincinnati Opens a Pandora's Box of Privacy Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2002, at Gi.
150. See O'Harrow, Jr., supra note 1, at Al.
151. Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Three Charged With Selling Confidential Data in FTC Sting,
WASH. POST., Apr. 19,2001, at E3.
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access to account information.1 2  Additionally, creditors give out
credit and establish new accounts if the applicant supplies a name,
SSN, and address.
The credit reporting system also employs inadequate precautions
to ensure against inaccuracies in credit reports and improper access to
the system. As discussed earlier, our financial reputations are
currently assessed by credit reporting agencies. These companies
report information about our financial condition and credit
worthiness to creditors and others. People are assigned a credit score,
which impacts whether they will be extended credit, and, if so, what
rate of interest will be charged. Credit reporting agencies do not
work for the individuals they report on; rather, they are paid by
creditors. As a result, they do not establish a relationship with those
they report on. Even though the FCRA gives people certain rights
with regard to the information reported about them by credit
reporting agencies, there is still a significant lack of accountability
because credit reporting agencies have no incentive to compete for
the business of those they report on. According to Lynn LoPucki, the
problem emerges because "creditors and credit-reporting agencies
often lack both the means and the incentives to correctly identify the
persons who seek credit from them or on whom they report. ' 53
LoPucki aptly shifts the focus away from the thieves and victims to
the entities controlling personal data. He correctly contends that
identity theft stems from the private sector's use of SSNs for
identification.54
Viewed in terms of architecture, we begin to see that identity
theft is part of a larger cluster of problems, caused by
bureaucratization. By this, I am referring to problems emerging from
the existence of information networks maintained by large
bureaucratic organizations. Bureaucratic organization, Max Weber
asserts, consists of a hierarchical chain-of-command, specialized
offices to carry out particular functions, and a system of general rules
to manage the organization.'5 Bureaucracy is not limited to public
sector organizations; it is a feature of business management as well
government administration.'56
Bureaucracy is deeply ensconced in the modern world, which
requires the efficient flow of information in order to communicate, to
deliver goods and services, to regulate, to oversee industries, and to
152. Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Concerns for ID Theft Often Are Unheeded, WASH. POST,
July 23, 2001, at Al; Ramirez-Palafox, supra note 79 at 486.
153. Lopucki, supra note 80, at 94.
154. Id. at 108-14
155. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 957-58 (Guenther Roth & Claus
Wittich eds. 1978).
156. Id. at 974.
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administer basic government functions. As Weber observes,
bureaucracy is "capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency
and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of
exercising authority over human beings."'57  According to Weber,
bureaucracy is a superior form of organization:
[Pirecision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity,
discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of
material and personal costs-these are raised to the optimum point
in the strictly bureaucratic administration."'
Although bureaucratic organization is an essential feature of
modern society and has numerous benefits, bureaucracy can also
present numerous problems. As Paul Schwartz notes, bureaucracy
depends upon "vast quantities of information" that "relate[] to
identifiable individuals."'59 Much of this information is important and
necessary to the smooth functioning of bureaucracies; but collection
and use of personal data pose new dangers to privacy. As the
Supreme Court noted in Whalen v. Roe:'
The collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare and social
security benefits, the supervision of public health, the direction of
our Armed Forces, and the enforcement of the criminal laws all
require the orderly preservation of great quantities of information,
much of which is personal in character and potentially
embarrassing or harmful if disclosed.6
There are several general tendencies of modern bureaucracies
that expose people to great vulnerability. Paul Schwartz contends
that because bureaucracy does not adequately protect the dignity of
the people it deals with, it can "weaken an individual's capacity for
critical reflection and participation in society."'62  Additionally,
decisions within public and private bureaucratic organizations are
often hidden from public view, decreasing accountability. As Weber
notes, "[b]ureaucratic administration always tends to exclude the
public, to hide its knowledge and action from criticism as well as it
can."'163 Bureaucratic organizations often have hidden pockets of
discretion. At lower levels, discretion can enable abuses. Frequently,
bureaucracies can fail to train employees adequately and employ sub-
par security measures over personal data. Bureaucracies are often
careless in their uses and handling of personal information.
157. Id. at 223.
158. Id. at 973.
159. Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of
the American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1332 (1992).
160. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
161. Id. at 605.
162. Schwartz, supra note 159, at 1365.
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These bureaucratic processes exist in a world where information
about people is collected, combined, and traded without their
knowledge or consent. People have minimal participation in the
process. They lack knowledge about what information is collected,
how it is used, to whom it is disclosed, and how carefully it is
protected. Privacy policies often promise that data will be kept
secure, but they fail to specify how or provide enough detail for
people to assess meaningfully the level of security.
Therefore, the problem runs deeper than identity theft. It is the
fact that we have so little participation in our personal data combined
with the fact that it flows so insecurely and carelessly without
sufficient control. The harm is not simply measured in the overt
instances of identity theft and abuse, but in the fact that we are made
more vulnerable to a series of errors, abuses, and dangers.
With ever more frequency, we are hearing stories about security
glitches and other instances of personal data being leaked and
abused. For example, in one instance, explicit details of ninety
psychotherapy patients' sex lives, as well as their names, addresses,
telephone numbers, and credit card numbers were mistakenly posted
on the Internet.' In 2002, identity thieves improperly used Ford
Motor Credit Company's code to access the credit files of 13,000 of
Ford's customers, which were maintained by Experian, a major credit
reporting agency. 6 Choicepoint, a database company that gathers
information about individuals and sells it to government agencies and
various private sector companies, inadvertently exposed some of its
databases on the Internet.167  Citibank employed a database
marketing company to collect the email addresses of its credit card
customers and send them emails offering them access to their
financial information .' This was done without verifying whether the
email addresses actually belonged to the particular customers.169
The problems of information handling are most vividly
illustrated by a recent incident involving officials at Princeton
University who improperly accessed personal information maintained
in a Yale University database. In December 2001, Yale University
established a website enabling undergraduate applicants to find out
165. Barb Albert, Patients' Medical Records Inadvertently Posted on Net,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 30, 1999, at Al.
166. Bruce Mohl, Large-Scale Identity Theft is Painful Reminder of Risk, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 12, 2002, at C3.
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whether they had been accepted or denied admission.' The website
also enabled students to enter additional information, such as their
interests and hobbies."' To gain access to the website, the students
were asked their name, birth date, and SSN. 7 2 SSNs were chosen as a
password because of their "personally identifiable nature., 17 3  A
Princeton University admissions official accessed Yale's website and
certain applicants' accounts on April 3, 2002.' This was made
possible by the fact that these applicants had also applied to
Princeton, and the Princeton admissions officials had the applicants'
SSNs. After the official informed other admissions staff of the ability
to log onto Yale's website, the admissions staff accessed additional
student files from admissions' office computers for a total of twelve
unauthorized visits to Yale's Web site.'75 Princeton officials checked
certain student files more than once.'76 The Princeton official stated
that he was motivated by curiosity and a desire to test the security of
a Web based system because Princeton was looking into providing a
similar system for admissions.'77 After discovering the unauthorized
access by Princeton, Yale reported the incident to the FBI.7 ,
The focus of the law in this security breach was on the actions of
the Princeton officials. Yet the problem was created by Yale's inept
security measures, ones that resemble in many ways those used by
myriad private-sector entities that hold even more sensitive personal
data and access to financial accounts.
Identity thieves exploit these inadequate security practices.
Exhortations to individuals to guard their data place the onus on the
wrong parties. No matter how careful people are, data is bound to
leak out in some form or another. We live in an information society,
and it is virtually impossible to go about daily life without giving out
information to a wide variety of people and entities. Documents with
sensitive personal information will be exposed in the trash. Not
170. Elise Jordan & Arielle Levin Becker, Princeton Officials Broke Into Yale Online
Admissions Decisions, YALE DAILY NEWS, July. 25, 2002, at http://www.
yaledailynews.com/article.asp?AID=19454; Susan Cheever, A Tale of Ivy Rivalry Gone
Awry, NEWSDAY, July 31,2002, at B2.
171. Jordan & Becker, supra note 170, at B2.
172. Tom Bell, Princeton Punishes Hacker of Yale Site, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 14, 2002,
at 7.
173. Id.
174. Patrick Healy, Princeton Says Curiosity Led To Yale Files, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug.
14, 2002, at A2.
175. Id.
176. Id. The files of one student, Lauren Bush, the niece of President Bush, were
accessed five times.
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LEDGER, Aug. 14,2002, at 15.
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everyone will buy a shredder. Nor will all purchase "firewalls" and
other computer security software. Even with additional precautions,
SSNs will invariably be obtained under certain circumstances. Being
secure requires individuals to take cumbersome steps, and most will
never take all the necessary precautions. Even if they did,
information could still be obtained by identity thieves. Much of a
person's sensitive information is not exclusively in the hands of that
person-it is in the hands of various companies. Some are companies
that a person does business with, such as financial institutions and
utility companies. But others are ones that gather data about people
without their knowledge and consent. In other words, even if a
person tries to keep her SSN as confidential as possible, there are
many entities that have it, and its security depends upon how
carefully these entities protect it. Frequently, these entities sell it to
whomever is willing to pay a small fee.
The disclosure of personal information such as SSNs, birth dates,
and mother's maiden names would not expose people to identity theft
if this data were not used by companies as a way to verify identity.
An identity thief has an easy time engaging in massive fraud given the
lax security of most private sector companies.79 For example, in one
instance, an identity thief routinely found lost wallets or took
discarded documents from customers at his former job. Armed with
victims' SSNs, the culprit would apply for in-store instant credit at a
variety of stores such as Sears, Circuit City, and Apple Computer
Stores. Despite the fact that the identity thief was 47 years old, he
used the identifying information of an 83-year old man, and was
readily approved by a store clerk running an instant credit check. 8'
As this example demonstrates, the problem emerges from the lack of
care in granting credit. Banks and institutions are in a rush to grant
credit, as illustrated by the fact that banks send out three billion pre-
approved credit card mailings every year.18
Private-sector entities are not the only institutions without
adequate controls on information security; government agencies are
also deficient. For example, there have been instances where identity
179. One commentator aptly notes that financial institutions are partly to blame in
identity theft cases because they may not keep customer data confidential, and he suggests
that courts hold them liable under a theory of breach of duty of confidentiality. See
Brandon McKelvey, Financial Institutions' Duty of Confidentiality to Keep Personal
Information Secure from the Threat of Identity Theft, 34 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1077, 1122-
23 (2001). Although recognizing that the problem stems from the private sector
institutions, the solution still focuses on forms of individual remedies rather than
architectural solutions.
180. See Dave Orrick, 47-Year Old Man Poses as 83-Year-Old in Financial Identity
Theft Scheme, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Aug. 16, 2002, at 1.
181. Nowhere to Turn, supra note 76, at 13.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54
thieves readily obtained driver's licenses in the names of their
victims.'82
Identity thieves, then, are only one of the culprits in identity
theft. The government and private-sector entities bear a significant
amount of responsibility, yet this is cloaked in the conception of
identity theft as a discrete crime that the victim could have prevented
had she exercised more care over her personal data. Identity theft
does not merely happen; rather, it is manufactured by a legally
constructed architecture.
Further, the architecture contributes to the harm caused to
victims of identity theft. Identity theft plunges people into a
bureaucratic nightmare. The identity theft injury to victims is often
caused by the frustration and sense of helplessness in attempting to
stop and repair the damage caused by the identity thief. Victims
experience profound difficulty in dealing with credit reporting
agencies"' and often find recurring fraudulent entries on their credit
reports even after contacting the agencies.'A Identity theft laws do
not adequately regulate the bureaucratic system that injures victims.
Identity theft exposes the indifference of the bureaucracies
controlling personal information to the welfare of the individuals to
whom the information pertains.
The traditional model does not recognize identity theft as being
constructed by the law and the under-regulated security practices of
bureaucracies. Therefore, the prevailing approach continues to focus
on the thieves and on how individuals can protect themselves, despite
the fact that many thieves are not caught and people cannot protect
themselves from identity theft. Identity theft can be prevented if we
reform the architecture. It is to this issue that I now turn.
III. Forging a New Architecture
If we see the problem architecturally, we see an architecture of
vulnerability, one with large holes, gaps, and weak spots. The harm is
caused by the very structure itself. Living in a dilapidated structure-
a building with flimsy walls, no locks, peepholes, inadequate fire
protection, and no emergency exits-is harmful, even without a
disaster occurring. Modern society is built on expectations-that we
will be kept secure, that our money will not be stolen, that our homes
will not be invaded, that we will be protected against violence. It is
difficult to imagine how we could maintain a free society if we did not
182. See Don Oldenburg, Identity Theft and Other Scams, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1997, at
D5; Bog Egelko, Identity-theft Victim Loses DMV Suit, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Apr. 13,
2002, at A15.
183. VACCA, supra note 70, at 54.
184. Nowhere to Turn, supra note 76, at 6-7.
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have protection against rape, assault, murder, and theft. If these
protections are inadequate, there is harm even without being
victimized. People live with greater fear, they stop going places, they
restrict what they do, and they alter how they live.
Effective safety is thus partly a design question. According to
Neal Katyal, physical architecture can be proactive in combating
crime, for it can prevent crime. For example, "cleanliness and
aesthetic appeal" can make people perceive that a place is safe and
orderly, and make people less likely to disrupt the place.' In a
similar manner, the architecture of information flows can be
redesigned to prevent identity theft and ameliorate its effects.
Identity theft is the product of an architecture that creates
vulnerability and insecurity. The most effective way to combat
identity theft is to reconstruct this faulty architecture.
The recognition that identity theft is the product of architecture
and is best dealt with architecturally is an important first step, for it
focuses the debate on the most relevant issues and concerns. But
difficult steps remain. What should an appropriate architecture that
protects against identity theft look like? In the remainder of this
article, I will explore architectural solutions to identity theft.
A. The Problem with Identification Systems
One of the predominant types of architectural solutions that
have been proposed for resolving the problem of identity theft is the
creation of a national identification system. For example, Amitai
Etzioni proposes a mandatory system of national identification.'86
Etzioni advocates the use of a universal identification card that is
linked to a database of personal information.' 7 He recommends the
use of biometric identification, which relies upon unique physical and
behavioral characteristics, such as hand prints, iris and retina patterns,
and facial appearance." This system of identification would replace
SSNs with a more reliable identifier, one that would make it harder
for identity thieves to fraudulently impersonate their victims.
Although a system of national identification, if administered in a
reliable manner, could curtail the problem of identity theft, it creates
more problems than it will solve. Etzioni severely underestimates the
dangers of creating a national identification system. As Richard
Sobel observes, "[i]dentity systems and documents have a long history
185. Katyal, supra note 54, at 1066.
186. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 103-37 (1999).
187. See id. at 113.
188. See id. at 115.
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of uses and abuses for social control and discrimination.', 89
Identification tools have been used by governments for rounding up
disfavored people.' 9° Etzioni contends, however, that identification
systems do not "transform democratic societies into totalitarian ones.
Totalitarian governments do not creep up on the trials of measures
such as identification cards; they arise in response to breakdowns in
the social order."' 9'
Although an identification system is not necessarily a catalyst for
totalitarianism, such a system is a powerful device that can be used by
the government in abusive ways. For example, the Japanese-
American Internment during World War II, in which over 100,000
citizens were imprisoned in camps, 92  depended upon the
government's ability to identify citizens of Japanese descent. 93
Additionally, identification systems often expand beyond their initial
purposes, as evidenced by the widespread expansion of the use of
SSNs.'9' Beyond abuses, identification systems are far from foolproof,
and one of the dangers of biometric identification is its permanent
connection to the individual. A digital thumbprint, for example, can
be stolen. If a password falls into the wrong hands, it can be changed;
one's thumbprint cannot.'95 In short, a national identification system
will pose significant dangers that may outweigh the benefits in
reducing identity theft.
Lynn LoPucki recommends a different form of national
identification system. LoPucki's profound contribution to the debate
over identity theft is his recognition that identity theft stems from
problems in identification which emerge with creditors, credit
reporting agencies, and other entities using SSNs and personal data as
passwords. LoPucki contends that the problem of identity theft can
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sources.").
191. ETZIONI, supra note 186, at 127.
192. ERIC. K. YAMAMOTO, ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS, AND REPARATIONS: LAW AND
THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 39 (2001). See also Eugene V. Rostow, The
Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945); Daniel J. Solove, The
Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941
(1999).
193. WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE: THE POLITICS
OF WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION 138 (1998); see also DAVID BURNHAM, THE RISE
OF THE COMPUTER STATE 24 (1983).
194. See supra Part II.C.
195. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, SECRETS AND LIES: DIGITAL SECURITY IN A
NETWORKED WORLD 144 (2000).
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be solved by devising a better system of identification. He disfavors
identity cards as a solution because they can be readily lost and
forged.9 LoPucki's proposed identification system would allow
people to "publicly register their identities and publicly provide
information for contacting and identifying them."'' 7  The system
would enable people to register their identities, provide identification
information, and choose from certain standard sets of instructions to
potential creditors for identifying them.9 This system would be
administered by a government agency.'99 Participation would be
optional." The government agency would maintain the database of
identification information, which would consist of various pieces of
information people submit such as biometric identifying
characteristics, photographs, height, drivers' license numbers,
personal data, and so on."' LoPucki would restrict the use of SSNs as
passwords, and SSNs would be publicly displayed on the website 2"
Instead of using SSNs for identification, creditors must consult the
website which contains each person's instructions for how to make
the identification. 3 Creditors failing to do so would "lose their
statutory exemption from liability for false reporting. ' "
LoPucki's solution is clever and creative. One laudatory aspect
of the system is that it allows people to participate in how they are
identified."' The system provides people with a limited form of
engagement over one aspect of their privacy-their identification.
Unfortunately, despite his great contribution toward
understanding the problem of identity theft, LoPucki's solution
suffers from the same problems as the traditional model. It relies too
heavily upon the initiative of individuals. The system places the onus
on the individual to set up an account, which requires a personal
appearance. Many individuals may not be computer-savvy enough to
access and monitor the website. Although it does establish a system
which can assist those who decide to utilize it, LoPucki concedes that
"most [people] are not likely to participate."2"6 As a result, it would
function as little more than a band-aid solution. Identity thieves
could concentrate their efforts on the vast majority of people who do
196. LoPucki, supra note 80, at 110-l1.
197. Id. at 134.
198. See id. at 114-35.
199. See id. at 115-16.
200. See id. at 114.
201. See id. at 117-18.
202. See id. at 119-20.
203. See id. at 119.
204. Id. at 114.
205, See id. at 118-19.
206. Id. at 114.
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not participate in the system. Of course, the system could be made to
be mandatory, but then it would become oppressive.
Additionally, I believe that LoPucki's solution will ultimately
cause more problems than it will solve. First, it depends upon the
government maintaining individuals' personal information. The
government has had significant security issues with its websites in the
past, and government websites have been hacked numerous times.
There is no guarantee that LoPucki's government agency will have
better data security practices than other government agencies.
Second, the website consisting of identifying information would
be publicly accessible to all: "Read-only access to the website would
be unrestricted."2 °7 This would widely expose this information, which
could be abused in other contexts. LoPucki's focus is on creditors
and credit reporting agencies, but identification can be used by a
multitude of other entities for a host of other purposes. Some people
do not want their address and other contact information to be
publicly displayed. They may be attempting to hide from abusive
spouses, stalkers, and others. LoPucki counters that people who
desire to conceal their location could use only email addresses,08 but
location can still be traced. As LoPucki notes, the person must
establish an email account through a national provider and must
install software to detect web bugs (hidden code in emails that can
obtain personal data from one's computer).2" The requirement that
people take these steps is another way in which LoPucki's system
would disadvantage those who are not computer-savvy.
Third, the public disclosure of SSNs will increase the use of the
number to link up records about people. Although it is certainly true
that SSNs are readily obtained, the availability of SSNs in this central
database will enable entities maintaining data systems to more
effectively and thoroughly gather SSNs, which function to connect
various personal information record systems together. As I have
discussed elsewhere at length, there are significant problems with the
growing aggregation of personal information by private sector
entities."O
Furthermore, address information could be readily snatched up
by database companies. LoPucki anticipates this problem and states
that the website data should be "'seeded' with information that can
be traced back to the website as its source."2 ' An example of such
seeding, LoPucki suggests, is that "the account owner might
207. Id. at 117.
208. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Did Privacy Cause Identity Theft?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1277,
1290-91 (2003) [hereinafter LoPucki I].
209. See id. at 1294.
210. See generally, Solove, Privacy, supra note 25.
211. LoPucki, supra note 80, at 131.
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deliberately misspell words, alter capitalization, or abbreviate
terms."2 '2 However, it is unclear whether many individuals have the
sophistication to concoct creative attempts to seed their information.
Even if the database were successfully seeded, this might not prevent
entities from abroad from misusing the information, and these entities
may be difficult to prosecute.
B. A New Architecture: Participation and Responsibility
I propose an architecture that establishes controls over the data
security practices of institutions and that affords people greater
participation in the uses of their information. The foundations should
be formed by the Fair Information Practices, which, as Marc
Rotenberg aptly observes, create an architecture for the handling and
use of personal information. '  The Fair Information Practices
originate with a 1973 report by the U.S. Department of Housing,
Education, and Welfare. The report recommended the passage of a
code of Fair Information Practices:
9 There must be no personal-data record-keeping systems whose
very existence is secret.
* There must be a way for an individual to find out what
information about him is in a record and how it is used.
* There must be a way for an individual to prevent information
about him obtained for one purpose from being used or made
available for other purposes without his consent.
9 There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a
record of identifiable information about him.
o Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating
records of identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of
the data for their intended use and must take reasonable
214precautions to prevent misuse of the data.
Subsequently, in 1980, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development ("OECD") established guidelines for
the protection of privacy. '" The OECD guidelines, building upon the
HEW report, recommended eight principles: (1) collection
limitation-data should be collected lawfully with the individual's
consent; (2) data quality-data should be relevant to a particular
212. Id.
213. See generally, Marc Rotenberg, What Larry Doesn't Get: Fair Information
Practices and the Architecture of Privacy, 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2001).
214. HEW 1973 REPORT, supra note 131, at 41.
215. GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF
PERSONAL DATA, available at http://wwwl.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/secur/prod/PRIV-EN.htm.
For a comparison of U.S. privacy law to the OECD guidelines, see Joel R. Reidenberg,
Restoring Americans' Privacy in Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 771
(1999).
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purpose and be accurate; (3) purpose specification-the purpose for
data collection should be stated at the time of the data collection and
the use of the data should be limited to this purpose; (4) use
limitation-data should not be disclosed for different purposes
without the consent of the individual; (5) security safeguards-data
should be protected by reasonable safeguards; (6) openness
principle-individuals should be informed about the practices and
polices of those handling their personal information; (7) individual
participation-people should be able to learn about the data that an
entity possesses about them and to rectify errors or problems in that
data; (8) accountability-the entities that control personal
information should be held accountable for carrying out these
principles.216
Paul Schwartz, Marc Rotenberg, Joel Reidenberg, and others
have long contended that the Fair Information Practices represent
the most effective foundation for the protection of privacy in the
Information Age.217 As Schwartz observes:
A distillation of fair information principles should be made around
four requirements: (1) defined obligations that limit the use of
personal data; (2) transparent processing systems; (3) limited
procedural and substantive rights; and (4) external oversight.18
The Fair Information Practices embody a particular
understanding of privacy and its protection. Understood broadly, the
Fair Information Practices establish an architecture that alters the
power dynamic between individuals and the various bureaucracies
that process their personal information. The Fair Information
Practices focus on two general concerns: participation and
responsibility. They aim to structure the information economy so
that people can participate meaningfully in the collection and use of
their personal information. This does not necessarily mean that
people are afforded dominion over their personal information; rather,
people are to be kept informed about the information gathered about
them and the purposes of its use; and people must have some say in
the way their information is processed. In other words, the Fair
Information Practices aim to increase individual involvement in
personal information systems.
Additionally, the Fair Information Practices bring information
processing under better control. Currently, as I have discussed at
216. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF
PERSONAL DATA, (Feb. 2002), available at http://wwwl.oecd.org.
217. See Schwartz, supra note 159, at 1667-1703; Rotenberg, supra note 213, at 36-50;
see generally, Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the
U.S. Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497 (1995).
218. Schwartz, supra note 159, at 1671.
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great length elsewhere, information processing is out of control."9
Companies collecting and using personal information are often doing
so in careless ways with little concern for the welfare of the
individuals to whom the information pertains. The Fair Information
Practices recognize that personal data processors have special
responsibilities and that they must be regulated in order to ensure
that they maintain accurate and secure records and use and
disseminate information responsibly.
The Fair Information Practices are a foundation. They are
general principles, and they establish the broad goals for information
privacy protection. At the most basic level, the Fair Information
Practices place the burden of addressing the identity theft problem on
the entities that cause it-the entities using personal information.
The effectiveness of the Fair Information Practices depends upon
how they are applied to particular privacy problems and how they are
enforced. In what follows, I will discuss how the two general aims of
the Fair Information Practices-participation and responsibility-can
be implemented to help grapple with the identity theft problem.
(1) Participation
First, the architecture should allow people to have greater
participation in the collection and use of their personal information.
Currently, people lack knowledge about the information collected
about them. Information can be readily disseminated and transferred
without a person's knowledge or consent. There are few
requirements for how secure information must be kept. There are
rarely any limits as to whom information can be disclosed.
Information can be used for whatever purpose the entity possessing it
desires.
I recommend an architecture that requires entities gathering
personal information about people to keep individuals informed
about their information. The credit reporting system needs to be
reformed. Currently, even with the FCRA, credit reporting agencies
are not responsive enough to the welfare of the people whose
information they collect and disseminate. For example, people
should be allowed to regularly access their credit reports for free.220
LoPucki criticizes this suggestion, contending that increasing a
person's ability to access information held by credit reporting
agencies will also increase the identity thief's ability to gain access as
219. See Solove, Privacy, supra note 25, at 1423-30.
220. In her testimony before Congress, Beth Givens recommended that "[a]ll
consumers should be able to receive one free copy of their credit report annually," and
noted that six states have enacted this measure into law. See Givens, supra note 70, at 6.
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well."' To fix this difficulty, a more radical change in the credit
reporting system may be necessary. An opt-in regime to credit
reporting would significantly curtail problems of improper access to
credit records. Currently, credit reporting agencies need not establish
any relationship to the people they report on. In an opt-in regime,
credit reporting agencies would have to contact individuals and would
be more accountable for improper access to credit records.
Individuals could access their credit records through passwords or
account numbers rather than by supplying SSNs or other personal
data.
When there is an unusual change in the behavior of a record
subject, such as when a person who regularly repays her loans
suddenly starts defaulting, credit reporting agencies should notify that
person. The architecture should empower people with an easy, quick,
and convenient way to challenge inaccuracies about their personal
information as well as fraudulent entries in their credit reports.
Disputes can be resolved with a special arbitration system that can
function quickly and inexpensively rather than resorting to expensive
court proceedings.
If these measures are taken, victims will be able to discover more
quickly the existence of identity theft since they will be better
informed about the data collected about them and how it is being
used.
(2) Responsibility
The architecture should also be premised on the notion that the
collection and use of personal information is an activity that carries
duties and responsibilities. The architecture would establish specific
measures of control over entities maintaining systems of personal
data. For example, if an entity is providing background-check
information about a person, that entity should be held responsible for
any inaccuracies or deficiencies in the information. After all, the
information is often used to determine whether a person obtains a
job, loan, or license. Currently, however, companies that collect,
disseminate, and use personal information do not have many
responsibilities and duties to the people to whom the information
pertains.
(a) Existing Accounts and Data Holders
To establish greater responsibility, the architecture would
regulate private sector security practices. For one, privacy policies
often merely state that data will be kept secure and safe, but these
221. See LoPucki II, supra note 208, at 1286.
April 2003] IDENTITY THEIFT
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
statements have little meaning without more knowledge of what
practices and measures are employed. Because security is technical in
nature, it is unlikely that many people will be able to understand and
evaluate the specific security measures taken.
Minimum security practices must be established for handling
people's personal information or accounts. An SSN, mother's maiden
name, and birth date should be prohibited as the method by which
access can be obtained to accounts. This is one aspect of LoPucki's
solution that would be quite helpful. However, instead of establishing
an elaborate voluntary public identification system as LoPucki
suggests, identity theft can be curtailed by companies maintaining
customer accounts employing alternative means of identification,
such as passwords.
This solution does not come without difficulties. Passwords can
be easily forgotten or found out. One method is the use of multiple
questions and answers supplied by the customer at the time the
account is created. Customers supply the question and the answer.
Questions can include one's favorite songs, places a person has
visited, and so on. These questions must vary from institution to
institution, for standardized sets of questions will result in identity
thieves attempting to find out people's answers to those questions.
With varying methods of identification, an identity thief will no
longer be able to use a few pieces of information to access everything.
This will eliminate the severity of the impact of identity theft. The
thief may be able to access one or two accounts, but not all of them.
Another problem is that so much personal information is maintained
by various database companies that a person's answers may exist in
these databases. For example, a person might use as a password the
name of her college, spouse, pet, or child. This type of information
should not be used since it is readily available in databases.
Another problem that might arise is that databases will come to
include the types of information that people generally use for these
questions. This difficulty demonstrates the importance of thinking
architecturally. The problem of identity theft is part of a larger
structure in which companies are not effectively regulated in the
collection, use, and dissemination of personal information. If
database companies are regulated to prohibit the collection of certain
types of information, then this data can be better protected from
falling into the hands of an identity thief. Further, the companies
maintaining accounts should use multiple series of questions rather
than just one question, as this decreases the odds that the identity
thief will have obtained all the necessary pieces of data.
Of course, this method of identification is far from foolproof.
But the level of sophistication and difficulty needed to carry out an
identity theft would be increased. Identity theft will become harder
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because thieves will no longer have easy access to all accounts
through the use of a few pieces of easy-to-find information such as
SSNs. Additionally, identity theft can be more readily halted. It is
currently a difficult and cumbersome process to change one's SSN.222
A person cannot change her height, birth date, or mother's maiden
name. But questions and answers or passwords can be easily be
changed. Thus, once discovered, identity theft will be easier to stop
and will not continue long after the victim becomes aware of it.
(b) New Accounts
The suggestions above concern access to already established
accounts. Much identity theft, however, occurs through the identity
thief opening up new accounts under the victim's identity. Currently,
it is far too easy to establish a new account through the mail and the
Internet.223 Pre-approved credit card applications, for example,
enable the recipient to easily establish an account and change
addresses. To halt this practice, credit card companies should be
required to meet with people in person when first creating the
account. This will make identity thieves more reluctant to engage in
fraud, as it will increase their chances of being caught. The downside
to this solution is its high cost. As LoPucki also notes, it is also
inconvenient for consumers."'
An alternative solution would be to require companies that want
to open a new account through the mail to verify a person's address,
date of birth, and phone number with a credit reporting agency and
then send written confirmation both to the address that the applicant
lists on her application as well as to the address that the credit
reporting agency has. Further, the company should follow-up by
calling the applicant's telephone number listed with the credit
reporting agency. In the event of any discrepancies in the
information held by the credit reporting agency and the individual,
the individual should be notified."' Many attempts at identity theft
can be halted if creditors take greater care at scrutinizing
applications.
LoPucki contends that even with this notification system, the
identity thief can still intercept the notification.226 While this is
222. See Linda Foley, Fact Sheet 17(L): Should I Change My Social Security Number?
(May 2002), at http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fsl7l-ssn.htm.
223. Billions of pre-approved credit offers are made to consumers each year, and there
is vigorous competition among creditors to find new customers. See Givens, supra note 70,
at 2.
224. See LoPucki II, supra note 208, at 1285.
225. Of course, this solution would only work well if people had greater participation in
the collection and use of their information by credit reporting agencies.
226. See LoPucki II, supra note 208, at 1286.
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certainly possible, it requires additional steps to carry out the identity
theft, ones that can increase the chances of the thief getting caught.
The solutions discussed above are only recommendations of the
types of solutions that can be employed once we recognize that we
need to focus on architecture. Viewing identity theft under the
traditional model has diverted needed attention from these
architectural concerns. If the architecture recognizes the
responsibilities of companies maintaining personal data, it will
provide a strong incentive for companies to devise creative solutions
and better security.
(3) Foundations
These architectural solutions do not require a radical change in
the law. The foundations are already present, although much remains
to be built upon them. One such foundation is the Federal Trade
Commission's ("FTC") enforcement over privacy policies. Beginning
in 1998, the FTC began to bring actions against companies breaching
their own privacy policies as a violation of the FTC Act's prohibition
against "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce." '227 In many of its actions thus far, the FTC has merely
policed privacy policy promises. The FTC's view to enforcement has
been to make practices match up to promises. As a result, the FTC
has been rather weak and reactive in its enforcement of privacy
policies.228 In a number of cases involving companies engaging in
blatant breaches of their own privacy policies, the FTC has settled,
requiring companies simply to stop the offending practices and avoid
making misrepresentations in the future.22
However, recently the FTC has begun to require greater security
as part of its settlements. In FTC v. Eli Lilly,23" a pharmaceutical
company had established an email service that sent emails to patients
227. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2002). An unfair or deceptive act or practice is one that
"causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably
avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers or to competition." 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2002). For a discussion of the rise of
FTC privacy enforcement, see Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm
Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2041 (2000).
228. For a discussion of FTC jurisprudence over privacy policies, see Jeff Sovern,
Protecting Privacy with Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1305
(2001).
229. See, e.g., In re Liberty Financial Companies, F.T.C. No. 98-23522, (May 6, 1999)
(operator of website falsely promised that personal data collected from children and teens
would be kept anonymous); FTC v. ReverseAuction.com, Inc., F.T.C. No. 00-0032 (D.
D.C. 2000) (company improperly obtained personal information from eBay and used it to
spam eBay customers); In re GeoCities, F.T.C. No. C-3849 (Feb. 5, 1999) (website falsely
promised that it never provided information to others without customer permission).
230. F.T.C. No. 012-3214.
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reminding them to take the anti-depressant drug Prozac.
Erroneously, the company sent out an email message with the email
addresses of all subscribers in the "To" line. The FTC complaint
alleged that Lilly failed to
provide appropriate training for its employees regarding consumer
privacy and information security; provide appropriate oversight
and assistance for the employee who sent out the e-mail, who had
no prior experience in creating, testing, or implementing the
computer program used; and implement appropriate checks and
controls on the process, such as reviewing the computer program
with experienced personnel and pretesting the program internally
before sending out the e-mail."'
The FT7C appropriately focused on security issues. Eli Lilly
settled and agreed to establish a new security program.2 32
Thus far, however, the FTC has been reactive, waiting for
specific harms to emerge before springing to action. A recent case
involving Microsoft Corporation will hopefully signal a shift toward a
more proactive solution. Microsoft's .NET Passport is an online
identification service that maintains personal information of Internet
users (such as email addresses, gender, photographs, age, and
interests) and allows users to use a single username and password to
access many different websites without having to sign-on to each
separately. Passport also provides a related service called Wallet that
enables users to enter credit card and billing data which can then be
used by multiple websites. In response to a complaint by a group of
privacy organizations led by the Electronic Privacy Information
Center, the FTC found on August 8, 2002, that Microsoft had violated
the FTC Act, and Microsoft and the FTC agreed on a settlement.233
Microsoft had promised in its privacy policy that it protected Passport
information with "powerful online security technology," but the FTC
concluded that Microsoft did not provide adequate security. As part
of the settlement, Microsoft must create a "comprehensive
information security program" and assess its security yearly. Further,
it must make its documents about security available to the FTC for
five years.
An interesting aspect of the Microsoft Passport case is that,
unlike the Eli Lilly case and the other cases before the FTC, the
security problems of Microsoft's Passport had not yet resulted in a
major security breach. Instead of waiting for specific harms to
231. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Eli Lilly Settles FTC Charges
Concerning Security Breach (Jan. 18, 2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2OO2/01/elililly.htm.
232. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW
544-46 (2003).
233. See In the Matter of Microsoft Corp., F.T.C. No. 012-3240 (2002).
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emerge, the FTC acted more proactively in this case, recognizing that
the harm existed in the architecture.
Unfortunately, a weakness in the proposed settlement is that the
security measures do not go far enough. The consent order lacks
specificity about security. Indeed, the Electronic Privacy Information
Center recently commented on a number of security weaknesses that
are not addressed by the consent order."'
Another hopeful development is the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
("GLB") Act. The GLB Act requires a number of agencies that
regulate financial institutions to promulgate "administrative,
technical, and physical safeguards for personal information." '235 On
February 1, 2001, several agencies including the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the
Office of Thrift Supervision issued standards for safeguarding
customer information.236 On May 23, 2002, the FTC issued similar
security standards.237 Pursuant to the FTC regulations, financial
institutions "shall develop, implement, and maintain a comprehensive
information security program" that is appropriate to the "size and
complexity" of the institution, the "nature and scope" of the
institution's activities, and the "sensitivity of any customer
information at issue., 236 An information security program consists of
"the administrative, technical, or physical safeguards [institutions] use
to access, collect, distribute, process, store, use, transmit, dispose of,
or otherwise handle customer information., 23 9 The regulations set
forth three objectives that a security program should achieve:
(1) Insure the security and confidentiality of customer information;
(2) Protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security
or integrity of such information; and
(3) Protect against unauthorized access to or use of such
information that could result in substantial harm or inconvenience
240to any customer.
The GLB Act is on the right track in its focus on information
security. The GLB Act represents an attempt at an architectural
solution to the problem of information security. However, the
regulations under the GLB Act remain rather vague as to the specific
234. Comments of the Electronic Privacy Information Center et al., to the Federal
Trade Commission, (Sept. 9, 2002), at http://www.epic.org/privacy/consumer/Microsoft/
ordercomments.html.
235. 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b).
236. See 66 Fed. Reg. 8616 (Feb. 1, 2001).
237. See 67 Fed. Reg. 36,484 (May 23, 2002).
238. 16 C.F.R. § 314.3(a) (2002).
239. Id. § 314.2(c).
240. Id. § 314.3(b).
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level of security that is required or what types of measures should be
taken. The regulations require institutions to designate personnel to
"coordinate" the information security program; and to "[i]dentify
reasonably foreseeable internal and external risks to the security,
confidentiality, and integrity of customer information."24' These
regulations establish rather broad obvious guidelines; they virtually
ignore specifics. 42 Of course, a rule that is too detailed in the
standards it required could end up being ineffective as well. As
Edward Janger and Paul Schwartz observe, "command-and-control
rules" which are detailed and inflexible, can "freeze development of
technologies and discourage recourse to less costly alternatives." '243
Janger and Schwartz are correct that such regulations, if too specific,
can quickly become obsolete, discourage innovation, and be costly
and inefficient. However, rules that are too open-ended and vague
can end up being toothless. Although security standards must not be
overly specific, they must contain meaningful minimum requirements.
Ultimately, the strength of the GLB Act's security protections
will depend upon how they are enforced. If enforced with an
understanding of architecture, the GLB Act has the potential to go
far in reforming security practices. However, even if the GLB Act is
enforced in this manner, the Act applies only to financial institutions.
A law requiring security procedures must encompass all institutions
that process personal information.
Despite these new security provisions, companies continue to
maintain lax security procedures for the access of financial accounts
and other personal data. Thus far, the FTC's efforts have been
somewhat anemic. With vigorous enforcement, security practices can
change. But it remains uncertain whether the FTC and other
agencies will undertake such a vigorous enforcement effort.
Conclusion
Understanding certain privacy problems as architectural-such
as identity theft-demonstrates that protecting privacy involves more
than protecting against isolated infractions. It is about establishing a
particular social structure, one that ensures individual participation in
the collection and use of personal information and responsibilities for
entities that control that data. In a regime with suitable architecture,
individual remedies will be far more effective. The problem of
241. 16 C.F.R. § 314.4 (2002).
242. For a good list of specific information handling practices, see Utility Consumers'
Action Network & Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Fact Sheet 12: Responsible Information-
Handling (May 2002), available at http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fsl2-ih2.htm.
243. Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information
Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1255 (2002).
April 2003) IDENTITY THEFT
1276 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54
identity theft may never be completely eradicated, but in a world with
the appropriate architecture, its prevalence and negative effects will
be significantly curtailed.
